

‘THE ROLE OF PERSONNEL IS CRUCIAL’: MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENT IN RUSSIA¹

Abstract

The article discusses the history of the development of local authorities in Russia. The focus is on contemporary situation, including the processes of formation and development of municipal service which provide human resources for municipal governments. The legal basis of municipal service, the socio-demographic profile of employees and their life strategies are disclosed. Considerable attention is given to the current problems of local authorities, and corruption in particular.

Keywords: local government in Russia; municipal authorities; municipal officials; life strategies; corruption.

1. Introduction

The history of local self-government in Russia goes back several hundred years. Its modern history began in 1864 through the *zemstvo* reform, which resulted in establishment of *zemstvos*, organs of rural self-government for administration of local affairs. Although *zemstvos* had limited powers, they were successful as a form of local self-government, which was the first experience of this kind in Russia. Nevertheless, this form did not develop in the Soviet period, when the soviets became the main government bodies. They were a part of the vertical power structure, which encompassed the central, regional and local governments. Although, according to the Constitution, local soviets were elected, they were not autonomous. Moreover, the power hierarchy had a dual

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character at all levels and included not only soviet but also Communist Party organs, which controlled and in fact substituted soviets.

Local self-government in Russia was restored by the liberal reforms of the 1990s, which, firstly, eliminated soviets and, secondly, created regional and local bodies which were independent from the centre.

The 1993 Constitution formalized the system of local self-government, which now relied on the principles of election, economic independence and autonomy. According to this Constitution, local government bodies were supposed to 'manage municipal property independently; plan and approve the local budget; spend budget funds; introduce local taxes and levies and collect them; maintain public order; and address other local issues' (Article 12).

The Federal Law No. 154 'On the General Principles of Organization of Local Government in the Russian Federation' of 28 August 1995 described the key principles but they neither contained any details of the regulation nor set any restrictions depending on the types of municipal institutions and the levels of self-government². Therefore, different regions had different organizational models of local self-government with varying degrees of autonomy.

In the early 2000s, the central government decided to change its policy towards local self-government in order to make it more centralized. This transformation had been completed by 2015 and resulted in local government structures losing some of their systemically important characteristics. Like in the Soviet period, local authorities once again lost their autonomy and became a part of the vertical power structure. This was achieved through a number of measures. Firstly, the government established federal districts headed by presidential envoys as intermediate management links. Presidential envoys oversaw the work of federal agencies in the regions.³ Secondly, the government changed the procedure for the formation of the Federation Council, which reduced the influence of regional governments on federal decision-making.⁴ Thirdly, the President was empowered to remove from the office heads of

² Federal Law No. 154-FZ of 28.08.1995 'On the General Principles of Organization of Local Government in the Russian Federation' (version of 21.07.2005), http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_7642/ (last accessed 30.06.2016).

³ Presidential Decree No. 849 of 13 May 2000 'On the Presidential Envoy in the Federal District', http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_23329/ (last accessed 30.06.2016).

⁴ Federal Law No. 113-FZ of 05.08.2000 'On the Order of Formation of the Federation Council of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation', http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_138549/ (last accessed 30.06.2016).

regional executive governments, elected by popular vote, and to dismiss regional authorities if the Court found that they had infringed federal laws⁵. The next step was to abolish direct elections of governors and to introduce a procedure of their appointment⁶. And, finally, regional and central authorities and governors became able to dismiss heads of municipalities on various grounds⁷, especially due to unlawful diversion of budget funds⁸.

The established system of inter-budget relations made municipal governments dependent from the regional authorities, which restricted autonomy at the local level. Municipalities receive most of their funding not as their own revenues but as financial assistance from the higher government structures in the form of special money transfers or subsidies (funding of priority expenditures) and subventions (funding for services delegated to local authorities from the central government).

Because of the above-described conservative turn, local governments lost their economic autonomy.

Local self-government in Russia is currently regulated by Federal Law No. 131-FZ 'On the General Principles of the Organization of Local Government in the Russian Federation' of 6 October 2003, which has been repeatedly revised and amended. In the period between 2003 and 2016, the original law was

⁵ Federal Law No. 184-FZ of 6 October 1999 'On the General Principles of Organization of Legislative (Representative) and Executive Bodies of State Government in the Subjects of the Russian Federation' (amended and revised), *Garant*, <http://base.garant.ru/12117177/#ixzz46eHl385y/> (last accessed 30.06.2016).

⁶ Federal Law No. 159-FZ of 11 December 2004 'On the Introduction of Amendments to the Federal Law 'On the General Principles of Organization of Legislative (Representative) and Executive Bodies of State Government in the Subjects of the Russian Federation' and to the Federal Law 'On the Main Guarantees of the Subjects of the Russian Federation' and to the Federal Law 'On the Main Guarantees of Voting Rights and Rights to Participate in the Referendum of Citizens of the Russian Federation', *Garant*, <http://base.garant.ru/12137945/#ixzz46ePPT6Rq> (last accessed 30.06.2016).

⁷ Federal Law No. 365-FZ of 27.12.2009 'On the Introduction of Amendments to Certain Legal Acts of the Russian Federation due to the Improvements in the Work of Governmental Bodies of Subjects of the Russian Federation and Local Self-Government' (version of 29.12.2014; amended and revised, has been in effect since 01.03.2015), http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_95495/ (last accessed 30.06.2016).

⁸ Federal Law No. 17-FZ of 15.02.2016 'On the Introduction of an Amendment to Article 74 of the Federal Law 'On the General Principles of Organization of Local Government in the Russian Federation', http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_193968/#dst100008 (last accessed 30.06.2016).

amended sixty-four times, which significantly changed its key provisions⁹. The continuing municipal reform seeks to reinforce the conservative trend and to transform the local self-government into the Soviet-style local government.

2. Anthropology of local government

The key element of any form of government, including municipal, is its personnel, that is, those people who have the authority (deputies, heads of representative and executive bodies) and municipal servants. The efficiency of governing bodies depends on their personnel. On the other hand, a municipal servant acts as an embodiment of power and as a reflection of the existing government system.

In Russia, despite the numerous attempts to democratize the system of state government, the trend for strengthening the power vertical always prevails, which means reinforcement of the centralized (authoritarian) system. Both the Russian Empire and the later Soviet system had extremely centralized state governments, which engendered a special type of government servants. This type meant complete dependence of junior ranks from their seniors; prevalence of the personal loyalty principle; lack of initiative (since in the rigid vertical of power obedience and diligence are valued most highly); corruption; and a low level of professionalism. The government tried to address these issues but without much success because they were determined by the system itself. In general, bureaucratization makes the centralized government model vulnerable because it lacks democratic mechanisms of control and its mechanisms of administrative control are ineffective.

We should take into consideration one more important point: the Soviet nomenclature led and realized the democratic reforms of the 1990s, that is, it managed to preserve its status and influenced the processes of creating the new state of the Russian Federation on all government levels. The Constitution of 1993 became a great achievement of the liberal and democratic forces because it laid the foundation for the democratic system of government both in the centre and locally. However, the realization of these principles was threatened: one of the reasons for the counter-democratic turn was the anthropological factor or the personnel who performed government functions at all levels.

⁹ Federal Law No. 131-FZ of 06.10.2003 'On the General Principles of Organization of Local Self-Government in the Russian Federation' (version of 15.02.2016), http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_44571/ (last accessed 30.06.2016).

Thus, in the post-Soviet period the state government (including local) passed through two stages of development: 1993–2000, democratization of power; 2000s-to present, counter-democratic reforms, contributing to centralization of regional and local self-government and making them a part of the power vertical, totally dependent from the centre. As a result, municipal government, which was intended to be a democratic institution, has evolved into its centralized form. This transition affected the personnel structure: the social and demographic characteristics of government servants and their legal status.

At the moment local government bodies include full-time municipal servants and those working on a contract basis. The former make the core of the local government. The prototype of modern municipal service was state service, which was established in 2003¹⁰. Municipal service is regulated by the Law of the Russian Federation No. 25-FZ of 2 March 2007 ‘On Municipal Service of the Russian Federation’ (the version of the Federal Law No. 160-FZ of 17 July 2009)¹¹. State and municipal service have a lot of similar characteristics, such as the legal status of state and municipal servants and the principles of staffing. The difference is that the system of municipal service is closer to the structure of local self-government and includes two categories of posts:

1. *municipal posts* (deputies of the representative body of local self-government; members of elected bodies of local self-government; elected officials of local self-government; members of election committees of municipalities with a casting vote);
2. *posts of municipal service* (posts in the local self-government; posts in the municipality’s election committee, formed in accordance with this municipality’s charter).

The ratio between these personnel categories is 1 to 30, that is, per each elected representative of local government there are over thirty servants working on a contract basis, which contributes to the bureaucratization of the system.

In municipal government, the law tightly regulates recruitment and promotion procedures and rules of conduct. Recruitment and promotion are done on a competitive basis in accordance with the prescribed set of competencies, the crucial requirements being loyalty and diligence. The Law of Municipal

¹⁰ Federal Law No. 58-FZ of 27.05.2003 (version of 13.07.2015) ‘On the System of State Service in the Russian Federation’, http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_42413/ (last accessed 30.06.2016).

¹¹ Federal Law No. 25-FZ of 02.03.2007 ‘On Municipal Service in the Russian Federation’, http://www.consultant.ru/document/cons_doc_LAW_66530/ (last accessed 30.06.2016).

Service, municipal charters and other legal acts determine the rights and obligations of municipal servants as well as the guarantees and restrictions relevant to their work.

The qualification criteria include the level of education; work experience in municipal service and in specific fields; professional competencies; Russian citizenship, and so on. A citizen cannot be employed as a municipal servant and a municipal servant is not allowed to continue performing his or her duties in the following cases:

- a. if the court finds them incapacitated or partially incapacitated ;
- b. if they have a conviction which prevents them from performing their duties;
- c. if they refuse to go through the procedure of security clearance to access classified information;
- d. if they are closely related to the head of the municipal administration (parents, spouses, children, siblings, close relatives of the spouse, children's spouses);
- e. if they fail to provide information required by the law or if they deliberately provided false information when they applied for a job in municipal service.

According to Article 14 of the Law on Municipal Service, municipal servants are not allowed:

- a. to be members of management bodies of commercial organizations or engage in entrepreneurial activities;
- b. accept gratuities from physical and legal persons in the form of gifts, money, loans, services, payment of their travel and entertainment expenses and so on;
- c. go on business trips at the expense of physical and legal persons;
- d. use material, technical and financial resources of their municipalities for purposes other than performance of their professional duties;
- e. disclose or use confidential information for purposes other than performance of their professional duties;
- f. make public comments, including comments made through mass media, about the activities of municipal governments, election committees and their heads;
- g. to use their official status to the advantage of political parties, religious and other non-governmental organizations and to publicly express their attitude towards them;

- h. create political, religious and other structures within the bodies of local self-government and other municipal bodies (except for professional unions, groups of veterans and other similar forms of social organization) or to assist in creating such structures.

Therefore, the personal and political rights of municipal servants are strictly limited. These limitations are imposed on freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom of movement and travel, the right to engage in entrepreneurial activities, the right to have foreign citizenship, the right to privacy, the right to form and join groups, and so on.

These constraints have not always been in force: before 2007 the municipal apparatus was formed in accordance with standard procedures of the labour law and the legal acts regulating the work of municipal government. Russian municipal service as a special institution is not a unique phenomenon: almost all European countries shared a similar experience, which was quite successful since it was realized within the framework of the democratic system of local self-government. In Russia, however, the authoritarian system of power has affected this institution and made it exercise tight control over municipal servants and their loyalty.

It is interesting that despite these legal constraints, jobs in state and municipal services are in demand due to a number of attractive perks such as the system of benefits. The stability of such employment makes up for comparatively low salaries. It proves to be particularly attractive for young people who are willing to work as state and municipal servants and are orientated towards the corresponding career strategies. Another fact proving the popularity of state and municipal service is that enrolment competition at universities is really fierce for majors related to state and municipal management. According to the Federal State Statistics Service, the staffing level at local government bodies is consistently high: for example, in 2015 it was 96%¹².

Therefore, in the 2000s the trend for reinforcing the vertical structure of power involved creating the state and municipal service which would be under full control of the central government and loyal to it. Such bureaucratic apparatus fits in with the model of authoritarian power and strengthens it.

¹² On the number and salaries of state and municipal civil servants on the regional level in 2015, *Goskomstat*, http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b04_03/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d06/54.htm (last accessed 30.06.2016).

3. The social and demographic portrait of municipal government

Let us now take a closer look at who comprises the personnel of municipal government and the main staffing tendencies. One of such trends is the steady increase in the number of municipal servants; another is the distorted gender-age structure, which is a sign of personnel imbalance.

From 1995 to 2011 the number of local governmental servants grew annually: it rose from 2.5% to 8.0%. In 2000, the Russian government, local self-government bodies and election committees of municipalities comprised 1 161 500 people; in 2011, 1 603 700. These figures include 448 000 and 501 900 people in local self-government bodies and election committees of municipalities respectively. In the representative bodies there were 3100 and 15 300 deputies and in local administrative bodies (executive-administrative bodies of municipalities), 444 900 and 483 500¹³.

Overall, in 2011, state and municipal government had 820,800 employees who had the status of state servants (70.9% of the total staff number) and 339 600 municipal servants (61.7%). In general, by 2011 there were 11.5 state and municipal servants per one thousand of people in Russia. According to 'Rossiyskaya Gazeta', in 2006 this indicator was ten state and municipal servants per one thousand people. It is interesting to compare these data with France, where it was 71.7; the USA, 70.4; Japan, 33.4; Norway, 24.7; and South Korea, 18.5¹⁴. The average monthly salary of civil servants in 2011 was 28.3 thousand roubles; for municipal servants it was 25.5 thousand roubles¹⁵.

The growing number of state servants is a natural trend which is caused by the growing complexity of the government system, when, in addition to governance, it starts to perform other functions such as interaction with the population (the concept of the service state¹⁶). Another important factor is the

¹³ The number of the staff of state and self-government bodies according to branches of power and levels of management, *Goskomstat*, http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b12_11/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d1/02-04.htm (last accessed 30.06.2016).

¹⁴ E. Domcheva, O. Kiryanov, *Civil servant is the most desired position*, 'Rossiyskaya Gazeta', <http://rg.ru/2006/04/13/chinovnika.html> (last accessed 30.06.2016).

¹⁵ On the number and salary of state civilian and municipal servants on the regional level in the first half of the year of 2011, *Goskomstat*, <http://www.gosbook.ru/node/33403> (last accessed 30.06.2016).

¹⁶ Y. Kozhenko, A. Mamychyev, *Service State: Theoretical Problems and Practical Challenges*, 'Vlast' 2010, No. 3, pp. 44–46; A.G. Kravchenko, *Service State: Problems of Establishing Interactive Bureaucracy*, 'Territory of New Opportunities. Journal of Vladivostok

internal law which determines the development of the bureaucratic apparatus: it always seeks to expand while reproducing itself. There have been many attempts to change this trend but without much success. In 2011–2015 the policy of staff optimization in state and local government, which sought to cut budget spending, resulted in 6.5% reduction in the staff number. In the first six months of 2012 there were 336 000 employees working in local self-government with the average salary of 29.2 thousand roubles¹⁷. In 2015 municipal services employed 314 500 people, that is, 65.5% of the total number of employees of local self-government bodies and election committees of municipal units. In 2015 the average monthly salary of municipal servants grew by 12.7% and was 37.1 thousand roubles¹⁸.

As for the age and gender structure of local government, the data as of 1 January 1999 show the dominance of women: they accounted for 75.9% and men, for 24.1%. By 2014 this figure had not changed much: as of 1 January 2013, there were 75.8% of women and 24.2% of men, which means that there must be systemic reasons for this imbalance¹⁹. The structure of local government has a clear division between the ‘managerial’ and ‘supporting’ positions, which are staffed independently of each other and which function separately and realize their own separate career schemes. ‘Managerial’ positions tend to be occupied by men and ‘supporting’ ones, by women. For example, in 2011 even though women dominated the structure of the whole local governmental apparatus, the high-level positions were mostly occupied by men (in 2011 they accounted for 62.8%) and mid-level, by women (83.3%)²⁰ Such situation

State University of Economics and Service’, 2013, No. 5(23), <http://cyberleninka.ru/article/n/servisnoe-gosudarstvo-problema-formirovaniya-interaktivnoy-byurokratii#ixzz46k5ceqpM> (last accessed 30.06.2016).

¹⁷ The Russian Federal State Statistics Service reported on the number and salary of civil servants in regions in the first half of the year of 2012, *Garant*, <http://m.garant.ru/news/418494/> (last accessed 30.06.2016).

¹⁸ On the number and salary of state civilian and municipal servants on the regional level in 2015, Goskomstat, http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/b04_03/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d06/54.htm (last accessed 30.06.2016).

¹⁹ The number of workers filling the positions of state civil and municipal services of the Russian Federation, according to gender, branches of power and levels of management, *Goskomstat*, http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/state/# (last accessed 30.06.2016).

²⁰ B.Y. Berzin, *Sociological Analysis of the Structure of the Government Apparatus: Modern Trends*, ‘Voprosy upravleniia’ 2012, No. 1(18), <http://vestnik.uapa.ru/ru/issue/2012/01/12/> (last accessed 30.06.2016).

demonstrates that the authoritarian/centralized systems of power still follow traditional concepts of gender-related career models and that the lower and middle management levels in municipal borders are feminized.

In 1999–2013 the age structure of municipal servants also underwent certain changes. Firstly, there was a growth in the percentage of young people under 30: from 12.3% in 1999 it rose to 15.4% in 2013. Secondly, the percentage of people aged 30–49 fell from 67.6% to 53.2%. Thirdly, the percentage of those aged 50–59 increased from 17.3% to 27.3%²¹. The average age rose from 41 in 1999 to 43 in 2013, which means that the process of personnel renewal is quite slow and that the current age imbalance is likely to increase in the future. The rising number of young people is undoubtedly a positive trend but it is still insufficient for any significant changes since young employees normally occupy junior positions with low salaries.

As far as work experience is concerned, at the end of 2011, 7.6% of the state and municipal personnel had up to one year of work experience in government bodies; 26.1%, up to five years; 22.4%, from five to ten years; 14.5%, from ten to fifteen years; 29.4%, over fifteen years²². We should point out that many ‘newcomers’ started their service in 2005 and 2006, when they accounted for 10% of all employees. In the recent years the percentage of workers with experience over fifteen years has grown by 4%. In municipalities the percentage of workers with experience between five and ten years (5%) have dropped slightly while the percentage of workers with experience over fifteen years rose from 22% to 28%. Overall, the most significant quantitative growth in comparison to 1999 has been observed in the group with experience of less than one year (2.2 times) and with experience of over fifteen years (2.6 times). This happened because municipal service has become more attractive for younger people and also because the municipal apparatus was ‘ageing’²³.

According to experts, municipal service faces shortages of qualified personnel. In general, from 1999 to 2013 there was a fall in the education level of state

²¹ The number of workers filling the positions of state civil and municipal services of the Russian Federation, according to gender, branches of power and levels of management, *Goskomstat*, http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/state/# (last accessed 30.06.2016).

²² B.Y. Berzin, *Sociological Analysis of the Structure...*

²³ The number of workers filling the positions of state civil and municipal services of the Russian Federation, according to gender, branches of power and levels of management, *Goskomstat*, http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/state/# (last accessed 30.06.2016).

and municipal servants. In state service, the percentage of people with higher education increased by 26.3% to make 92.3% in 2013. The situation in local governmental bodies is markedly different: they have less workers with higher education (51.7% in 1999; 84.8%, in 2013) but the total number of workers with higher education has grown more than threefold. Their professional education is not always field-specific, which means that according to statistical data as of 1 January 2011, 10.3% of municipal servants had legal education; 31% were university graduates majoring in economics and management, which includes 18.6% specializing on state and municipal management; 11.7% had pedagogical education; 5.5%, agricultural; 41.5% majored in other fields such as international relations, physics and mathematics, social studies, culture and art, hospitality and so on²⁴.

Since over a half of municipal servants do not have field-specific education, additional professional training becomes particularly important. According to the law, a municipal servant has to take a course of continuing professional training once in three years. In 2003–2014 13.2% of municipal servants completed courses of continuing professional training every year. This figure reached its peak in 2014, when 18.6% underwent professional training in the form of one- or two-week courses (95.9%)²⁵.

The analysis of the statistical data has shown that municipal service faces the following personnel-related issues: despite the staff optimization reforms, the apparatus of municipal government continues growing: from 1999 to 2015 it almost doubled. The feminization trend also persists although men prevail in the leading positions. The personnel renewal of municipal service goes quite slowly, which increases the age-gender imbalance.

Since 1999, municipal servants have improved their professional competencies but the percentage of workers who do not have field-specific education is still quite high. Serious funding shortages caused by the economic recession impede the government's efforts to promote continuing professional training among municipal servants.

²⁴ V.I. Patrushev, G.Y. Uzilevsky, V.V. Zima, *Analysis of the Main Indicators of the Personnel Structure of Municipal Service*, 'Srednerussky Vestnik Obshestvennykh Nauk' 2015, Vol. 10, No. 6, p. 31.

²⁵ The number of workers filling the positions of state civil and municipal services of the Russian Federation, according to gender, branches of power and levels of management, *Goskomstat*, http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/state/# (last accessed 30.06.2016).

4. Life strategies of municipal servants

For our study it is important to focus on personal targets and priorities of state and municipal servants since they may affect the future of the whole social development. It is an essential anthropological aspect of power, which brings to light personal meanings inherent in its practices and the underlying system of values and goals.

Strategies play an important role in human activity and can serve as points of reference in people's professional work²⁶. According to Erich Fromm's humanistic psychoanalysis, a person can occupy three different, although interconnected positions when relating to self and others: *have* (receptive orientation); *achieve* (exploiting and marketing orientation); and *be* (creative or productive orientation)²⁷. The dominant form of the person's activity determines the types of life strategies the person prefers: receptive-hoarding, which is the basis of the strategy of welfare; motivational or exploiting/marketing, which underlies the strategy of success; and, finally, creative or productive, which corresponds to the strategy of self-fulfilment.

The strategy of welfare is one of the most widely spread types of personal strategies, which includes receptive and hoarding activity and orientation towards consumption and obtaining (but not creating) resources, seeking a comfortable, stable and relaxed life. *The strategy of success* is associated with a pro-active approach to life, orientation towards achieving high results; ability to live and work in the conditions of uncertainty and risk; original thinking, flexibility and realization of different cultural styles; striving for public recognition; and so on. *The strategy of self-fulfilment* implies applying a creative approach to life and its challenges, orientation towards self-development and self-improvement²⁸.

With regard to the management system these motivational aspects are particularly important since they determine the ways power is realized. For

²⁶ K.A. Abulkhanova-Slavskaya, *Strategy of Life*. Moscow 1991; V.A. Goryanina, I.K. Masalkov, *Transformation of Life Situations. Efficient Psychosocial Technologies*. Moscow 1999; E.I. Golovakha, *Life Perspective and Personal Value Orientations*, [in:] L.V. Kulikov (ed.), *Psychology of Personality in Works of Russian Psychologists*, St. Petersburg 2000, pp. 212–267; Y.M. Reznik E.A. Smimov, *Life Strategies (Comprehensive Analysis)*, Moscow 2002; N.F. Naumova, *Life Strategies in Transitional Societies*, 'Sotsiologicheskyy Zhurnal', 1995, No. 5, pp. 4–21; T.E. Reznik, Y.M. Reznik, *Life Strategies*, 'Socis' 1995, No. 2, pp. 98–104; and others.

²⁷ E. Fromm, *Man for Himself: An Inquiry Into the Psychology of Ethics*, Moscow 2010.

²⁸ Y.M. Reznik, *Social Dimension of Lifeworld (Introduction to Sociology of Life)*, Moscow 1995, pp. 78–84.

example, the strategy of welfare means that municipal servants seek stable and relaxed life, comfort and security. The strategy of success implies that people have a need for public recognition and approval, for high social status associated with power and money. People who follow the third, creative strategy, seek self-improvement and self-fulfilment.

According to the surveys conducted in 2001 and 2005²⁹, among Russian civil servants of all age groups, values associated with the strategy of welfare ranked highest: these included stable employment and social status (41% of respondents). Values of the strategy of success ranked second: realization of professional competencies (40%); opportunities for career growth (20%); and opportunities for occupying a prestigious position in the society (12%). These are followed by the values related to the self-fulfilment strategy, including the motivation to serve one's society and state (30%). In 2001 young state and municipal servants generally preferred the strategy of success (43%), which distinguished them from other age groups. They were looking for interesting jobs and professional development and wanted to earn good salaries and improve their housing conditions. About 30% of young respondents favoured the strategy of welfare: they were interested in good working conditions, job security, and the high level of income (see Table 1).

Table 1. Dynamics of changes in the life strategies of Russian and Ural state and municipal servants (2001–2005).

Life strategies	Young state and municipal servants (2001)	Young state and municipal servants (2005)	State and municipal servants of all age groups (2001)	State and municipal servants of all age groups (2005)
Strategy of welfare	30.8%	46.0%	41.0%	49.3%
Strategy of success	43.3%	21.8%	40.0%	20.3%
Strategy of self-fulfilment	37.3%	41.9%	20.0%	38.7%

Source: T.V. Primak, *Life Strategies of Civil Servants of the Ural Federal District During the Administrative Reform: Social Aspect*, 'Vestnik Upravleniya' 2008, No. 3, <http://vestnik.uapa.ru/ru/issue/2008/03/06/> (last accessed 30.06.2016).

²⁹ T.V. Primak, *Life Strategies of Civil Servants of the Ural Federal District During the Administrative Reform: Social Aspect*, 'Vestnik upravleniya' 2008, No. 3, <http://vestnik.uapa.ru/ru/issue/2008/03/06/> (last accessed 30.06.2016).

By 2005 the situation had considerably changed: there was an increase in the number of respondents, including young ones, orientated towards the strategy of welfare. The values of family, children, and health were traditionally prioritized regardless of the age, gender and status characteristics of respondents. However, older civil servants (40–49 and over 50) were more orientated towards these values than those under 30.

The percentage of people following the strategy of success reduced almost by half. The on-going reforms and reorganization processes affected the stability and made it hard for people to plan their careers. Only a small group of career-orientated civil servants (about 20%) sought to improve their positions and to be promoted through personal achievement.

Among young civil servants, the percentage of people orientated towards self-fulfilment remained unchanged. Such position tends to be more characteristic of young people, who seek to fulfil their potential (see Table 1). At the same time there has been a growth in the number of people of all ages orientated towards the self-fulfilment strategy. Such dynamics to a great extent reflects the influx of young people to state and municipal service.

In 2010, according to E.I. Vasilieva, when choosing state or municipal service, people prioritized stability and security (38.2%), an opportunity of gaining professional experience (58.8%), and their interest in the job (41.2%). The respondents who pointed out that the job must be interesting also believed in the importance of high income and were mostly deputy directors and their assistants. The lower the position, the more pronounced are such motivations as gaining experience and job security. This means that state and municipal service is expected to provide stable employment, high income and welfare³⁰.

These strategies and motivations affect the behaviour of civil servants and their attitudes to their duties. According to the results of the joint research conducted in 2005 by the Institute of Social Studies (Russian Academy of Sciences) and Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Russian civil servants are typically characterized by indifference and formalism (63.7%); corruption (58.5%); and indifference to the interests of their own country (41.1%)³¹.

³⁰ E.I. Vasilieva, *Motivation of Professional Activity of State Civil Servants. Synopsis of Candidate's Thesis in Social Sciences*, Ekaterinburg 2010, pp. 17–18.

³¹ V.I. Oseichuk, *New Principles of Selection and Promotion of State Servants: Efficiency of the Staffing Policy*, 'Chinovnik' 2006, No. 6, <http://www.law.edu.ru/doc/document.asp?docID=1264229> (last accessed 30.06.2016).

5. Corruption and local self-government

Corruption is one of the most serious problems faced by local governments³². According to the survey conducted by the Russian Public Opinion Research Centre in November 2012, 75% of respondents thought that the level of corruption in the society is high or even very high. It was also pointed out that local governmental bodies are the most corrupt ones in Russia (36% of respondents in 2012 in contrast to 26% in 2007)³³.

It is hard to estimate the exact degree of corruption in local governmental bodies but there are certain trends which can be observed. Cases of corruption are most often found in large municipalities with complex structure of executive bodies. In regional and municipal government bodies corruption is mostly related to:

1. privatization of municipal property;
2. tenders for purchasing of goods and services;
3. leasing property and land;
4. allocation of benefits and privileges.

Municipal property operations offer a lot of opportunities for corruption. According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, every tenth detected case of official misconduct was related to privatization of municipal property. At the early stages of privatization about 30% of all resolutions in one way or another contain violation of the existing laws³⁴. The most frequent types of malfeasance are embezzlement and bribery. In almost a half of all Russian regions, there were criminal charges brought against officials from municipal administrations, territorial property management committees and property funds involved in privatization. There are also numerous cases which do not directly fall within the scope of criminal liability: for example, setting prices for privatized objects below their real value; manipulations with tender requirements and procedures; buying enterprises through ‘straw men’, and so on.

The diversity and complexity of crime in this sphere shows how corrupt local government bodies are. Experts distinguish between the three types of

³² V.I. Vasiliev, *Struggle with Corruption and Local Self-Government*, ‘Zhurnal Rossiyskogo Prava’ 2012, No. 4, pp. 5–17.

³³ *Russian Public Opinion Research Centre: Russians Consider Local Government Bodies to be the Most Corrupt*, ‘Vzglyad’, 29 November 2015, <http://www.vz.ru/news/2012/11/29/609425.html> (last accessed 30.06.2016).

³⁴ V.V. Moiseev, *Struggle with Corruption*, Moscow 2014, p. 47.

corruption schemes: 'black', 'gray', and 'white'. 'Black' schemes correspond to direct embezzlement of budget funds, which is detected quite easily by regulatory agencies. Examples of such schemes include payments for the work which has not been done; procurement at below-market prices; and so on. 'Gray' schemes are more complex and more difficult to detect. These include, for instance, selling municipal property at understated prices at auctions. Since each object is different, it is quite hard to detect such cases or to prove that the purchase price was understated. Another example of 'gray' schemes is adjusting tender requirements in such a way so that to exclude any real competition and ensure the winning of one specific offer. 'White' corruption schemes are even more sophisticated than 'gray' ones because they involve adjustments of regulatory documentation. It is almost impossible to reveal such schemes by using standard investigatory procedures. An example of such a case can be a corruption scheme to purchase de-icing agents which was realized in Moscow. It took a year to develop it³⁵.

Another sphere in which corruption thrives is government procurement. The scope of bribery crime, 'kickback' schemes and embezzlement in the sphere of government procurement is estimated as one trillion roubles per year and accounts for almost 20% of the annual government purchases. In 2011 prosecutors found and eradicated over 33 thousand law violations in government procurement procedures. As a result, 9.3 thousand people were subject to administrative or disciplinary action³⁶.

Some experts believe that the fact that bureaucracy has always been the only ruling class in Russia is at the core of the corruption issue³⁷. The modern bureaucratic apparatus has become much more alienated and remote from the population than its predecessors. Therefore, it is the bureaucratic character of local self-government which makes it inefficient and prone to corruption and red tape.

³⁵ Study *Corruption of Government Bodies as Presented by Russian Mass Media: Spheres, Schemes, and Sums. Top High-Profile Corruption Cases*, <http://kprf-kchr.ru/?q=book/export/html/4423> (last accessed 30.06.2016).

³⁶ M. Privalova, *The Russian Style of State Procurement: 400 Methods of Drawing Money out of the Population*. <http://www.rbc.ru/economics/21/03/2012/642667.shtml> (last accessed 30.06.2016).

³⁷ A.N. Sokolov, *Corruption, Civil Society and Law-Bound State (Comparative Legal Analysis)*, 'Zhurnal Rossiyskogo Prava' 2008, No. 8, <http://w.pc-forums.ru/m2627.html> (last accessed 30.06.2016).

6. Conclusion

The current state of municipal service in Russia can be best described by using the words of Karl Jaspers: ‘The apparatus, which is supposed to serve the interests of the population, serves itself. It demands stabilization and security of itself. This is possible because its very complexity removes it from public control. It becomes opaque and moves continually further out of reach of criticism. Finally, no one can see through it, save those who are within it, and even they can only see through their own special field. It becomes immune to attack either from the side of the populace or from the side of the supreme organs of government’³⁸.

Therefore, the transformations of municipal government affected certain characteristics of municipal personnel but these very characteristics have been then turned into a key tool to manage the ongoing transformation process. This problem can be addressed by restoring the democratic foundations of local self-government and creating a system of public control to supervise its activities.

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³⁸ K. Jaspers, *The Origin and Goal of History*, transl. from German, 2nd ed., Moscow 1994, pp. 194–195.

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Lyudmila Mazur
Ural Federal University